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TAIWAN
Melos or Pylos?
James R. Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara
The past four years have witnessed an unexpected warming of relations be-tween the United States and China. The rancor generated by the EP-3
spy-plane controversy and the debate over American arms sales to Taiwan dissi-
pated in the wake of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on New York and
Washington. Beijing supported the U.S.-led campaign in Afghanistan. It has co-
operated with the United States in the war on terror,
sharing intelligence and coordinating law-enforcement
efforts.1 Perhaps most strikingly, Chinese officials
have worked quietly but assiduously to break the nu-
clear impasse on the Korean Peninsula.
Understandably, many observers in the West have
hailed the seeming shift in Chinese foreign policy in a
more pro-American direction, interpreting it as evi-
dence that Sino-American relations will remain on
the upswing. Other moves by Beijing, however, cast
doubt on this optimistic view. Wary of Taiwan’s seem-
ing drift toward independence, China has stationed
some five hundred ballistic missiles across the Taiwan
Strait from the island and is deploying additional mis-
siles each year.2 These missiles have no plausible pur-
pose other than to coerce Taipei into opening talks on
reunification with the mainland—or, failing that, to
batter the island into submission.
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Chinese leaders have talked, loudly and often, about doing just that if the Tai-
wanese persevere in President Chen Shui-bian’s plans to enact a new constitu-
tion by 2008.3 Beijing interprets Chen’s advocacy of a new constitution as a
precursor to de jure independence from the mainland. In the meantime China
has pursued an aggressive program of military modernization, purchasing or
building the armaments it would need to make good its threats against the
island.4 Of particular note are purchases of aircraft, warships, and missiles
overtly intended to give the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) the ability to fend
off U.S. reinforcements if indeed Beijing chooses war.5
On the other side of the Strait, the deeply divided Taiwanese electorate and
legislature have been unable to agree to arm themselves.6 Plans to purchase die-
sel submarines from the United States, for example, have effectively been
shelved;7 that decision leaves the Taiwanese navy with only four boats—two of
World War II vintage—to fight off China’s large, increasingly potent undersea
force.8 The outlook for Taiwan’s surface fleet is equally bleak. Four retired Amer-
ican guided-missile destroyers are scheduled for delivery starting this year, but
Washington, fearful of antagonizing Beijing, has yet to approve the sale of Aegis
destroyers that Taiwan really needs if it is to shoot down the barrage of ballistic
missiles likely to be lofted its way in wartime.9 Even if the Bush administration
relents on an Aegis sale, it remains doubtful that Taiwanese lawmakers will be
able to set aside their factional bickering long enough to approve the billions
needed for such a purchase.
In short, the cross-Strait military balance is tipping rapidly in favor of the
mainland at a time when pressure is mounting on Beijing to act. The likelihood
of a war in the Strait in the near term has risen sharply. If the military imbalance
continues to grow and Taipei persists with Chen’s plans for a new constitution,
thus edging toward one of Beijing’s red lines for military action, Taiwan could
suffer the fate that befell another island nation that dared, two and a half millen-
nia ago, to defy a powerful neighbor that coveted its territory. Taiwan needs to
consider that fate and how it can be avoided. China too could learn from island
wars of antiquity. Beijing ought to take a clear-eyed look at the hazards of pro-
tracted maritime war before it reaches for the gun. Finally, the United States
could find in this historical case grist for some of the hard thinking it has to do
about the cross-Strait impasse.
MELOS AND TAIWAN
The classics can help Taiwanese, Chinese, and American leaders sort out the sit-
uation in the Taiwan Strait. In 416 BC the leadership of the Greek city-state of
Melos opted to fight the mighty Athenian empire rather than accept vassal sta-
tus. Athens had been at war against Sparta, to the south in the Peloponnesus,
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more or less continuously since 431 BC (see map). Athens had been unable to
make much headway on land against the vaunted Spartan infantry, while Sparta
was no match for Athens at sea. Frustrations were mounting on both sides. A
fragile peace was in place, but it was in the process of unraveling.10
Athens chose this moment to target Melos. Why? Thucydides, the premier
historian of the Peloponnesian War and an eyewitness to many of the war’s
events, sheds light on Athenian motives in his account of the Melian Dialogue,
the famous exchange be-
tween top Melian leaders
and an Athenian delega-
tion dispatched to wring
surrender from them in
advance. After pleading
unsuccessfully with the
Athenian ambassadors to
allow the island to main-
tain its neutrality, the
Melian Council opted for
defiance. Melos fell after a
brief siege. The Athenian
assembly voted to kill its
adult male population
and enslave the women
and children.
Several themes emerge from the Melian Dialogue that bear on China-Taiwan
relations. First of all, questions of justice do not arise in international politics
absent a rough parity of arms between the contending sides. This elemental real-
ity was not lost on the Melian spokesmen, who seem to have resigned themselves
to defeat from the beginning. “We see that you have come prepared to judge the
argument yourselves, and that the likely end of it all will be either war, if we
prove that we are in the right, and so refuse to surrender, or else slavery.”11
The Athenians agreed, noting that in practical terms “the standard of justice
depends on the equality of power to compel and that in fact the strong do what
they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept.” For
them this was divine law. “Our opinion of the gods and our knowledge of men
lead us to conclude that it is a general and necessary law of nature to rule what-
ever one can.” This was a permanent precept of international relations, con-
cluded the Athenians: “Anybody else with the same power as ours”—including
the Melians—“would be acting in precisely the same way.”
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The geopolitical realities and the power disparity involved in today’s cross-
Strait relations are as stark as they were in classical Greece. Even a quick glance at
the map (page 48) shows that China, by its size and proximity to Taiwan, casts a
long and ominous shadow over the island. China’s military and economic resur-
gence and its pretensions to great-power status have already sown doubt that
Taipei could hold Beijing at bay for long. Not surprisingly, some analysts and
policy makers in the West have already resigned themselves to the apparently in-
evitable outcome for Taiwan.12 In essence they have succumbed to Thucydides’
maxim concerning the repercussions of fundamental power imbalances be-
tween nations.
This is more than mere perception—the military balance is shifting in
China’s favor. As we have seen, Beijing is pursuing a determined, methodical
military modernization program, while the Taiwanese legislature remains dead-
locked over the future of the nation’s defense. The qualitative advantage long en-
joyed by the Taiwanese armed forces began to slip away in the mid-1990s, and it
continues to do so.
As the preponderance of power shifts toward the mainland, the arguments
proffered by those with a sanguine view of the cross-Strait stalemate lose cre-
dence.13 China will gain a decisive military edge in the Strait, and sooner rather
than later. Indeed, by some accounts a reckoning with Chen’s regime could take
place this decade. If dominant power does in fact negate considerations of jus-
tice in asymmetric relationships, as the Athenian ambassadors maintained,
China may soon be able to act against Taiwan with impunity.
Second, a powerful nation can use its armed might for a variety of purposes de-
rived from the Thucydidean motives of fear, honor, and interest. An empire might,
for instance, use its military power to acquire strategically placed territories. “By
conquering you,” proclaimed the Athenian ambassadors, “we shall increase not
only the size but the security of our empire.” For Athens there were obvious
geostrategic advantages to wresting Melos from its inhabitants. The island was
ideally positioned off the southeast coast of the Peloponnesus. Operating from
bases on the island, the formidable Athenian navy could conduct operations along
the Spartan periphery, amplifying the already dominant seapower of Athens.
The Athenians also wanted to make an example of Melos, which had stub-
bornly maintained its independence in past years and had taken up arms to re-
sist the imperial will. Many Athenian allies, weary of the high cost of war and the
increasingly tyrannical behavior of Athens, had grown restive. The Athenians
could not allow the Melians to defy them, lest they embolden others to seek lib-
erty from imperial rule. “We rule the sea and you are islanders, and weaker
islanders too than the others,” observed the Athenian emissaries to the Melians;
“it is therefore particularly important that you should not escape.”
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The strategic calculations evident in the Athenians’ deliberations about
Melos, particularly with respect to the island’s favorable geographic position
and its potential to encourage would-be rebels, can be detected in Chinese
thinking about Taiwan. Another look at the map makes it abundantly clear that
geographic destiny binds Taiwan to China. The island’s position off the Chinese
coast imposes a natural constraint on naval power-projection from the main-
land. In a very real sense, then, Beijing’s aspirations to regional and world power
hinge on gaining control of Taiwan.14
The Chinese landmass radiates outward into the Pacific in a broad arc reach-
ing from the Shandong Peninsula in the north to Hainan Island in the south. Yet
the island chain that stretches from the Japanese home islands to the Philippine
archipelago envelops this continental crest. Taiwan holds a central position in
the island chain, sitting directly and conspicuously opposite the center point of
the mainland’s coastline.
For Beijing, in short, Taiwan represents either a gateway to the western Pacific,
a vast expanse long dominated by the U.S. Navy, or a sentinel blocking China’s
strategic access to the high seas.15 Chinese analysts are quick to quote Secretary
of State Dean Acheson, who in
1950 sketched a “defense per-
imeter of the Pacific” running
along the island chain;16 they
also recall General Douglas MacArthur, who famously depicted Taiwan as “an
unsinkable aircraft carrier,” able to radiate power along China’s coasts.17
Not surprisingly, Chinese strategists have repeatedly urged Beijing to neutral-
ize the hostile forces occupying the island, thereby ensuring that China’s navy
can operate freely along the nation’s maritime periphery and project power be-
yond the island-chain perimeter.18 They hope to extend China’s own defense
perimeter seaward, in effect inverting Acheson’s strategy.
There is also an inescapable imperial dimension to China’s strategic calculus,
just as there was for the Athens of antiquity. The Chinese leadership understands
that failure to subdue Taiwan could embolden independence movements within
its own far-flung and ethnically disparate western provinces, namely Tibet and
Xinjiang.19 Just as Athens’s increasingly tenuous hold over its empire hardened
its position over Melos, Beijing can ill afford to “lose” Taiwan, for fear of un-
leashing even greater centrifugal forces in China’s hinterlands. Unification with
Taiwan promises to foreclose the possibility that separatists will draw inspira-
tion from Taiwanese insolence.
Beyond its imperial possessions, Beijing worries about China’s domestic con-
stituents, who are riven by deeply ingrained regionalism and suffer from socio-
economic dislocations, the latter an unintended by-product of two-plus decades
H O L M E S & Y O S H I H A R A 4 7
Fear, honor, interest—Thucydides could scarcely
have phrased it better.
5
Holmes and Yoshihara: Taiwan
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2005
of government-instituted economic reform.20 As the appeal of communist ide-
ology dwindles, Communist Party leaders have increasingly invoked economic
prosperity and nationalism to shore up their legitimacy and hold together a
deeply fractured polity.21
Should Taiwan declare and successfully maintain its independence, failure by
Beijing to fulfill its decades-long promise to recover the motherland’s last piece
of lost territory would surely discredit Chinese rulers and might foment domes-
tic instability. Just as the Athenians worried about the integrity of their empire,
so too are national unity and survival of the regime at stake for China.
Third, the side endowed with
preponderant armed strength
has the luxury of pursuing a
harsh diplomacy with the objec-
tive of winning without resort to
arms (the “acme of skill” in Chi-
nese statecraft).22 It can attempt
to browbeat a weaker opponent
into submission by holding out
the prospect of defeat and
destruction.
This, as much as any coarsen-
ing of Athenian virtue during
the course of protracted war,
helps account for the ruthless,
frankly immoral tone of the
Athenian pronouncements to
the Melians.23 The Athenian
ambassadors waved away the
Melian petition for justice: “We
on our side will use no fine
phrases saying, for example, that
we have a right to our empire
because we defeated the Per-
sians, or that we have come
against you now because of the
injuries you have done us—a
great mass of words that nobody
would believe.”24 Not persuasion
but brute power was deployed
at Melos.
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China’s rhetoric over Taiwan has been equally stark.25 President Chen’s talk of
independence has aroused consistent, severe consternation among the Chinese
leadership. Even top leaders have not shied from bombast: “We totally have the de-
termination and the ability to crush any attempt to separate Taiwan from China,”
Communist Party chief Hu Jintao
told an enthusiastic crowd of Chi-
nese officials who had gathered to
mark Deng Xiaoping’s hundredth
birthday. “We should extensively
unite all sons and daughters of the Chinese nation, including all Taiwan compatri-
ots, to jointly oppose and contain Taiwan independence splittist forces.”26 Hu’s
brand of exhortation, which dominates China’s cross-Strait diplomacy, closely
mirrors Athens’s morally dubious attitude toward Melos.
Lieutenant General Liu Yuan of the People’s Liberation Army was even more
blunt and graphic. Writing in the official China Youth Daily in response to ru-
mors that Taipei might attack the Three Gorges Dam during a cross-Strait war,
Liu vowed that China would “be seriously on guard against threats from ‘Taiwan
independence terrorists.’ ” He insisted that China would not be deterred by such
tactics, promising “retaliation that will ‘blot out the sky and cover up the
earth.’”27 If Liu’s words are any guide, the Chinese are prepared to inflict un-
thinkable (perhaps nuclear) devastation on the island.
Admittedly, bluster is a staple of Chinese diplomacy, but Beijing has put steel
behind its pronouncements, placing force and coercion at the forefront of its
strategy toward Taipei. Chinese rulers have clearly set out to use fear, the un-
avoidable consequence of a sharp power imbalance between contending na-
tions, to modulate Taiwanese behavior.
Fourth, hope is not a strategy in international politics. The Melian represen-
tatives held that because their cause was just, they could trust to fortune, or to
the Spartans to intervene and avert disaster. They maintained that “in war for-
tune sometimes makes the odds more level than could be expected from the dif-
ference of numbers of the two sides.” They also pointed to the geographic
proximity of Sparta and an ethnic affinity between Spartans and Melians: “We
think [the Spartans] would even endanger themselves for our sake and count the
risk more worth taking than in the case of others, because we are so close to the
Peloponnese that they could operate more easily,” and because “we are of the
same race and share the same feelings.”
Hoping to disabuse the Melians of their illusions, the Athenians delivered a
blunt rejoinder. “Hope, that comforter in danger!” they sneered. Unless “one has
solid advantages to fall back upon,” in the form of hard power, hope is folly. The
Melian army could not compete with the Athenian expeditionary force. The
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Athenians, moreover, scoffed at Spartan seapower, a central element in any relief ef-
fort. No outside power, let alone fortune or the gods, would step in to save Melos.
Taiwan’s apparent overconfidence in the ability and willingness of the United
States to defend it during a cross-Strait conflict suggests that Taipei harbors sim-
ilar hope. Some observers have warned that Taipei’s behavior in the past few
years, especially following President George W. Bush’s 2001 pledge to do “what-
ever it [takes] to help Taiwan defend herself,” reflects a misguided calculation
that Washington’s support is and will remain unconditional.28 President Chen’s
provocative referendum bid prior to the most recent presidential elections
seemed to confirm his faith in the United States.29 In other words, Chen, encour-
aged by Bush’s words, may have concluded that he holds a blank check from
Washington to push his agenda, regardless of how Beijing reacts.
Far from being chastened by President Bush’s rebuke over the referendum issue
or Chen’s setback in the December 2004 legislative elections, independence-
minded leaders in Taiwan have continued to goad China.30 The logjam in the
Legislative Yuan over the U.S. arms package provides further evidence of a belief
among Taiwanese leaders that Washington’s defense commitments are absolute.
In a stunning display of naiveté, one opposition member reportedly argued that
since Taiwan could not possibly defend itself, even with new weaponry, the
island should simply hope for American intervention.31 Another, responding to
American pleas to approve the arms package, likened the United States to a “ma-
fia leader” demanding “protection money.”32
Such statements bespeak a fundamental unseriousness of purpose. The Tai-
wanese leadership may truly believe that America’s resolve to help the island is
unshakable. Alternatively, Taipei’s inaction could simply be a symptom of the
island’s venomous partisan politics. Either way, Taiwan could soon find itself in
a Melian predicament.
Taipei should not blindly count on the United States to defend it. Even if the
political case for U.S. intervention were beyond dispute—say, if China launched
an unprovoked attack on the island—Washington’s ability to deter and to fight a
cross-Strait contingency stands on increasingly shaky ground. Over the next de-
cade, the growing capacity of Chinese naval, air, and missile forces will pose an
ever more daunting challenge to American defense planners.33 Indeed, fears that
Beijing will soon be able to deny the U.S. Navy access to the Taiwan Strait in war-
time are already palpable in certain Pentagon documents.34
China’s ability to pursue a strategy of sea denial, then, is growing and will
have direct consequences, for both the U.S. military and Taiwan’s security.35 As-
suming that the PLA proceeds along its modernization path, it will soon field a
force capable of keeping U.S. reinforcements at a distance while Beijing prose-
cutes a showdown with Taiwan in which the balance of forces overwhelmingly
5 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
8
Naval War College Review, Vol. 58 [2005], No. 3, Art. 3
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol58/iss3/3
favors China. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense has estimated that the Chi-
nese military will gain the upper hand by 2006.36 Lee Jye, the minister of national
defense, recently told lawmakers that the mainland would pose a “reliable
threat” by 2015.37
If these predictions come to pass, China will have gained the ability to inflict a
Melian fate on Chen’s regime, securing a swift victory that would forestall Amer-
ican intervention. Beijing could then thereby present the world with the fait ac-
compli of a reunified China. These emerging strategic realities should impel
Taipei and Washington to rethink their long-standing assumptions surrounding
the cross-Strait military balance and its political implications. Taipei must guard
against the temptation to free-ride on U.S. defense commitments. As the Chi-
nese military improves its war-fighting capabilities and doctrine, Washington
cannot continue to take the PLA as lightly as it has for decades. It behooves the
Pentagon to begin thinking ahead about its military strategy for a cross-Strait war.
At the same time, the United States should remain vigilant about Taiwanese
actions that could trigger a Chinese military response. In their discussions with
Taiwanese leaders, U.S. leaders should attempt to inject a measure of realism
into Taipei’s strategic thinking. Taiwan is of course free to pursue its destiny as a
de facto independent country. If it opts for de jure independence, however, it
must generate the military means necessary to uphold its political aspirations.
Washington must caution the island’s leadership against the kind of brinkman-
ship that could end up costing American lives.
Taiwan cannot pin its desire for more international space and independence
on American political sympathies alone. No amount of shared democratic val-
ues between the two nations will compel the United States to sacrifice its vital
national interests. Over the course of its history, argues one perceptive Chinese
analyst, “America shows itself to be a country that acts most on its strongest in-
terests. It has never shown a willingness to help a ‘drowning dog’” such as Tai-
wan. Concludes this analyst, “ ‘American honor’ seems unlikely to provide a
sufficient motivation for American intervention” in the Strait.38
Fear, honor, interest—Thucydides could scarcely have phrased it better.
TAIWAN AS PYLOS
Thucydides’ account of the impending demise of Melos underscores the politico-
military difficulties that Taiwan will face in the coming years, particularly in
light of Taipei’s apparent indecision over its defense. Even if Taiwan finds itself
in a Melian predicament, however, China will still face daunting operational
barriers that will keep very steep the military costs of imposing such a fate on the
island. Notwithstanding the Melian precedent, China should be wary of a clash
of arms in the Strait, at least in the short term.
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If Thucydides’ account of the Melian Dialogue provides a cautionary tale for
Taipei, his account of another battle, at Pylos, offers the same for Beijing. The
battle took place in 425 BC, a few years before the encounter at Melos. The out-
come demonstrates the practical difficulties involved with island warfare, even
for a combatant that, like Sparta, enjoys military superiority on land, can
achieve temporary superiority at sea, and is fighting close to home against an en-
emy encumbered by long, hazardous lines of communication. If the Melian
Dialogue shows that Taiwan needs to beware of the emerging military imbalance
in the Strait, the Pylos case warns China that it should not blithely assume that
its growing military power would assure it an easy victory over Taiwan.
China, which occupies an operational position similar to that of Sparta,
would do well to heed Thucydides’ observations on the Athenian-Spartan en-
counter at Pylos. The Athenian experience shows how difficult it is to take an
island by force, even with the advantage of dominant seapower; Sparta’s experi-
ence shows that a land power can achieve initial success in island warfare yet see
its expeditionary force cut off and defeated by an adversary with a superior navy.
What transpired at Pylos? In the spring of 425 BC, “before the corn was ripe,”
an Athenian fleet under Demosthenes was cruising off the west coast of the
Peloponnesus, ostensibly to succor embattled democrats in Corcyra (modern
Corfu, off the northwestern coast of Greece near the modern Albanian border)
before sailing on to Sicily.39 But the Athenian commander in fact “had other
ideas.”40 He intended to break
with Pericles’ strategy of periph-
eral amphibious raids, landing at
Pylos, some fifty miles from
Sparta, and building a permanent
fort there. Demosthenes’ fellow
commanders, Eurymedon and Sophocles, wanted to push on to Corcyra, there
to confront a Spartan flotilla.41 Luck favored Demosthenes—a squall carried the
Athenian fleet into Pylos, where he “at once urged them to fortify the place,”
pointing out that it “was distinguished from others of the kind by having a har-
bor close by.”42
The advantages of fortifying Pylos were many. From a permanent base in the
Peloponnesus, Athenian triremes could range across the peninsula’s maritime
frontiers. From there the Athenians could foment rebellion among the large
population of Spartan helots (slaves), threatening the survival of the Spartan re-
gime. Local allies could “do [the Spartans] the greatest harm from it.”43 Pylos
would be a magnet for escaped helots.44 In short, it would be a permanent irri-
tant to the Spartans, much as the Spartans’ periodic invasions of Attica vexed the
Athenians. Sparta would find itself, in effect, in the position of modern China
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with respect to Taiwan: China’s Cold War confrontations with the United States
over Taiwan stemmed in part from fears that the island might be exploited as a
geopolitical springboard from which hostile external forces would seek to inter-
fere in the mainland’s internal affairs. This sentiment persists. Indeed, Chinese
leaders have long asserted that overt Taiwanese collusion with “foreign forces” (a
thinly veiled reference to the United States) would constitute a casus belli com-
parable to an outright declaration of independence.
As for the Spartans, although they “at first made light of the news” that
Demosthenes’ troops were building a fort, they quickly grasped the geopolitical
significance of a nearby Athenian outpost.45 The Spartans recalled an invasion
force then in Attica after only fifteen days and diverted it toward Pylos by land
and by sea, “hoping to capture with ease a work constructed in haste, and held by
a feeble garrison” by joint action.46 The Spartan commander planned to block
the two channels into the harbor, using “a line of ships placed close together with
their prows turned toward the sea” to turn away the expected Athenian rein-
forcements.47 To buttress the Spartan defenses further, a force of some 420 hop-
lite warriors (heavy infantry in armor) landed on Sphacteria, a long, narrow
island that sat athwart the harbor mouth.
By this means both the island and the continent would be hostile to the Athenians, as
they would be unable to land on either; and since the shore of Pylos itself outside the
inlet toward the open sea had no harbor, there would be no point that the Athenians
could use as a base from which to relieve their countrymen. Thus the Spartans would
in all probability become masters of the place without a sea fight or risk, as there had
been little preparation for the occupation and there was no food [in the Athenian fort].48
Meanwhile, Demosthenes, realizing that a joint Spartan assault was immi-
nent, “was himself not idle.”49 He took charge of the Athenian defenses, paying
particular attention to the beaches, the weakest point in the defensive perimeter.
The Spartan troops were ultimately unable to establish a beachhead, “owing to
the difficulty of the ground,” which kept them from landing except in small de-
tachments, as well as to “the unflinching tenacity of the Athenians.” “It was a
strange reversal of the order of things,” observes Thucydides, “for Athenians to
be fighting from land . . . against Spartans coming from the sea,” since Spartans
“were chiefly famous at the time as an inland people and superior by land” while
Athenians were “a maritime people with a navy that had no equal.”50 China, a
traditional continental power with minimal amphibious forces, would do well
to bear this Spartan example in mind.51
The Spartans desisted from their attacks after two days of fighting and pre-
pared to invest Pylos. Before they could do so, however, Athenian reinforce-
ments arrived on the scene, in the form of fifty warships. The Athenians
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immediately assailed the Spartan vessels, some of them lined up for battle, some
still beached and being manned. The Athenian triremes put the Spartan ships to
flight “at once,” disabled “a good many vessels” and captured five, rammed some
of the ships that had fled to shore, and began towing away beached vessels aban-
doned by their crews. “Maddened by a disaster” that cut them off on Sphacteria,
proud Spartan infantrymen were reduced to wading into the surf in a vain effort
to drag their vessels back ashore.52 “The stunning effect and importance” of the
Athenian action, notes a recent historian of the campaign, “cannot be exagger-
ated.” Spartan commanders immediately requested an armistice, agreeing
among other things to turn over their fleet to the Athenians and to allow the
Athenian fleet to continue with the blockade it had imposed on the island while
Spartan envoys set sail for Athens to parley.53 As for contemporary China, the
reigning consensus among Western analysts holds that it would likely meet
Sparta’s fate should it attempt a conventional military assault on the island.
Whether Beijing would accept a diplomatic settlement following a disastrous
military defeat in the Taiwan Strait is less certain.
The Spartan delegates, upon arriving in Attica, appealed to the Athenian as-
sembly to conclude a magnanimous peace. They exhorted the Athenians to “em-
ploy your present success to advantage, to keep what you have got and gain
honor and reputation besides,” while suggesting that Athens would pay dearly if
it opted to “grasp continually at something further.” The Spartans were
uncowed, however, claiming that their defeat had been the result of miscalcula-
tion rather than “any decay in our power.” For “what power in Hellas stood
higher than we did?”54 Accepting peace now, they claimed, would spare the Athe-
nians the permanent enmity of Sparta while helping them gain the acceptance of
the Greek world, which would be grateful for concord between the two great
powers. Nonetheless, Cleon, a popular—and belligerent—Athenian leader, pre-
vailed upon the assembly to demand more: the Spartans must agree to allow
their infantrymen to be brought from Sphacteria to Athens, and they must sur-
render certain territories.
Thucydides offers here some telling commentary about the perils of island
warfare. Even Athens, the preeminent sea power of Greek antiquity, encountered
difficulties at Pylos. The Athenians besieging Sphacteria found the Spartan re-
sistance frustratingly resilient until their own reinforcements arrived, giving
them an unchallengeable numerical edge. Athenian logistics were strained,
making it difficult to maintain the blockade. The Spartans, for their part, dis-
played considerable ingenuity, promising to reward with their freedom helots
willing to carry provisions to Sphacteria and thus risk capture by the besieging
force. The Athenians’ “greatest discouragement arose from the unexpectedly
long time which it took to reduce a body of men shut up in a desert island, with
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only brackish water to drink.” The Athenian garrison received few seaborne pro-
visions, even in good weather; the surrounding countryside “offered no re-
sources in itself ”; and the onset of winter would have ultimately compelled
Athens to lift the siege, allowing Spartan troops to sail away in the craft that de-
livered their stores.55
In any event, Cleon’s harsh demands carried in the Athenian assembly, but
the Spartans rejected them. Cleon “violently assailed” the emissaries, then ex-
horted the assembly to send a new expeditionary force to Pylos to overpower the
Spartan resistance. The assembly took him up on the idea; having boasted that
he could achieve victory in a matter of weeks and reacting to needling from his
critics, Cleon consented to lead the force. Detachments of the new force landed
on opposite sides of the island; the Athenians all together now outnumbered the
Spartans on Sphacteria on the order of twenty-five to one. Given these lopsided
numbers, the outcome was certain, notwithstanding the Spartan hoplites’ indi-
vidual superiority over the assailants.56 Peace ultimately followed—vindicating
Cleon’s more bellicose approach to the war in the minds of some scholars: “The
events at Pylos completely changed the outlook of the war.”
With valuable Spartan hostages, Athens needed no longer fear a Spartan inva-
sion. It had little to fear at sea, since it had kept the fleet surrendered by Sparta
under the terms of the armistice (reneging on its commitments under that armi-
stice). It was free to exact new tribute from its allies, replenishing a treasury
depleted by prolonged war. Athens had also gained the upper hand on a
broader level. Until Pylos, the Peloponnesians had inflicted damage upon their
enemies while suffering little damage to their own interests. “Now the Athenians
could inflict continuing harm on their enemies, on land and by sea, fearing no
retaliation.”57
To apply the case to the present day, a similarly propitious outcome for the
United States after a conflict over Taiwan would surely prove to be a strategic
nightmare for China. What other lessons does the Pylos episode hold? First, as
Athens learned during the early stages of its offensive against Sphacteria, islands
can be at once invaluable from a geopolitical standpoint and difficult to in-
vade—especially when they are in the hands of stubborn defenders. Even coun-
tries with powerful naval forces should leaven their calculations with a healthy
respect for this reality. The political and military costs of naval and amphibious
warfare can be prohibitive. Despite the geopolitical value that China attaches to
Taiwan, the island may not be the pushover Beijing seemingly expects.
Second, and closely related, time may not be on China’s side during a Taiwan
Strait contingency. Whether a barrage of ballistic missiles would cow Taipei into
suing for peace, as Beijing seems to assume, is an open question. Nor does China
have the means to land a large expeditionary force on the island. While the PLA
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Navy may be able to fend off the U.S. reinforcements for weeks, that might not be
enough. Should the U.S. Navy force the Strait, any Chinese forces on Taiwan
could find themselves blockaded by the Seventh Fleet, much as the Spartans on
Sphacteria found themselves encircled by Athenian triremes. Humiliating defeat
could follow.
Third, military failure can endanger the survival of a regime as easily as can
allowing the defiance of a wayward province to go unpunished. Sparta had to
fear the possibility of a helot-led revolution after the debacle at Pylos. So too
might China’s social, economic, and political fissures widen if Beijing tried—
and failed—to reunify the motherland by force of arms.
Fourth, the repercussions of failure for China’s international standing could
be dire, as they were for Sparta. “After the victory at Pylos,” observes the promi-
nent historian Donald Kagan, “no island could think of defying the Athenians.”58
Likewise, an American victory in a Taiwan contingency could bind not only Tai-
wan but Asia’s other island nations to the United States, setting back China’s
quest to resume its “central position” in Asian politics.59 Like Taiwan, China
should take note of Thucydides’ enduring wisdom.
A MELIAN FATE?
If taken to heart, lessons of the Peloponnesian War could help clarify thinking—
and dispel dangerous illusions—in Taipei, Beijing, and Washington. Does Tai-
wan’s predicament resemble that of Melos? Will China heed the lessons of Pylos
and take a cautious stance in the Strait, or will it plunge ahead and risk suffering
Sparta’s fate? Will the United States clarify its cross-Strait diplomacy and ready
its military strategy and forces in case diplomacy fails?
While historical comparisons of this kind are always inexact, four factors will
determine which model applies. First is the matter of the military balance. As has
been seen, China is poised to seize its advantage over Taiwan. Beijing is develop-
ing military means commensurate with its expansive political ends and will, by
many measures, soon hold a commanding position in the Strait. Yet a Chinese
victory is far from foreordained. The Chinese navy’s feeble amphibious fleet, for
instance, appears unequal to the missions likely to be assigned it. If China
chooses to act against Taiwan without substantially strengthening its military
capabilities in such areas, Beijing could well meet the fate of the Spartans on
Pylos. In fact, Chinese weakness at present suggests that Beijing will continue to
demonstrate a measure of restraint for the rest of this decade, biding its time
while marshaling the capacity to subdue Taiwan. If Beijing remedies such weak-
nesses, gaining true military dominance not only over Taiwan but over any
American force likely to be sent against it, it could skew cross-Strait relations in a
Melian direction.
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Second, the decisions taken by China’s political leadership are another obvi-
ous factor shaping events in the Strait. In keeping with the Melian precedent,
Beijing may well opt to pursue an even more assertive, no-nonsense diplomacy
as its strategic posture improves. Beijing’s calculations, however, could and
should be different from those of the Athenians. Athens could justly scoff at
Spartan seapower, which at the time was no match for their own. It was foolish,
consequently, for the Melians to wager their survival on Peloponnesian rein-
forcements. China cannot so lightly discount U.S. military power. Nor will Chi-
nese leaders be eager to earn the enmity of the world superpower at a time when
they covet international commerce and the economic development that comes
with it. These considerations warrant caution on Beijing’s part.
Third, Taipei’s actions will have an impact. The contrast between Chinese reso-
lution and Taiwanese irresolution could scarcely be sharper where military affairs
are concerned. Whether by conscious decision or through Taiwanese lawmakers’
inability to set aside partisanship, Taiwan’s means are increasingly out of sync
with its own political ends. That
will be doubly true if Chen Shui-
bian expands those ends by press-
ing ahead with his plans for a new
constitution and ultimate inde-
pendence. Taipei needs to put its
military affairs in order and think twice about provoking Beijing—else it could
meet a Melian fate. Taipei must also come to terms with the operational con-
straints intrinsic to a contingency in the Strait for the U.S. military, the exigen-
cies of worldwide American security commitments, and the reluctance of the
United States to make an enemy of China, East Asia’s foremost power. These fac-
tors could impel Washington to hesitate in a crisis, allowing Beijing to achieve a
Melian outcome. Taipei’s confidence in American intervention, then, could be
misplaced.
Finally, the United States faces daunting challenges in managing the volatility
of cross-Strait dynamics. Washington’s ability to prevent either side from edging
toward conflict could come under increasing strain. In particular, U.S. deter-
rence and reassurance in the Strait could continue to erode, especially in light of
other pressing global security commitments. The shifting military balance in
Beijing’s favor and China’s growing geopolitical preponderance have increased
the likelihood that Taipei will be forced to make the unsavory choices that Melos
had to face. From an operational perspective, China is steadily rectifying its mili-
tary shortfalls, easing the operational problems that both Athens and Sparta
confronted at Pylos. Diplomatically, Washington’s limited influence over the
course of events in Taiwanese politics could further exacerbate the deteriorating
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strategic equation if the island’s leadership continues to permit its military
means to languish. What the United States can do to arrest these trends remains
uncertain. In short, Washington may find it increasingly difficult to dissuade
China from attempting a Melian solution to the cross-Strait impasse.
Leaders in all three nations should take Thucydides’ lessons to heart as they
frame their diplomatic and military strategies. On balance, the four factors ex-
amined above suggest that the belligerent logic behind the Melian analogy will
eventually outweigh the operational constraints intrinsic to the lessons of
Pylos—making war thinkable for Beijing. The Melian outcome was determined
by basic structural features of international politics: power and fear. In contrast,
the operational constraints demonstrated at Pylos may prove to be transitory for
China, soluble as its military modernization continues. One thing is clear: Taipei
cannot afford to put off work on its own defense needs. China is watching. Taiwan
must put its own house in order—or run the risk of becoming a latter-day Melos.
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